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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 960560-CA 
v.. : 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, : Priority No 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal fr om a denial of defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas to robbery, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann § 76-6-301 (1990) ; aggravated assault:, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (1990); and 
kidnaping, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-301 (1990), in the Seventh Judicial District Court, Carbon 
County, the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
!• Did the trial court:'A erroneous but incidental reliance 
on the doctrine of res judicata in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas affect the outcome of thin case? 
This Court may "affirm the judgment . . . on only one of the 
grounds relied on by the trial court." Callister v. Millstream Assoc., 
Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah App. 1987). 
2. Did the trial court reasonably refuse to extend by four 
years the 30-day deadline for defendant to withdraw his 1992 guilty 
pleas? 
An appellate court will reverse a trial courtfs decision on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if "it clearly appears that 
the trial court abused its discretion." State v. Mildenhall. 747 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
3. Did the trial court err by not sua sponte converting 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the criminal action 
into a separate/ civil post-conviction petition? 
Because defendant failed to preserve this claim by a timely 
objection below and does not argue any exception to the preservation 
requirement on appeal, this claim is not subject to review under any 
standard. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(where appellant does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or 
"plain error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, this Court 
will decline to consider it on appeal). 
4* Was the trial court required to hold an evidentiary hearing 
on defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas? 
The question of whether an evidentiary hearing is required is 
generally within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g. , Andrews 
v. State Board of Pardons. 836 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) 
(commutation of sentence); Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 
P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996) (attorneys fees); Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 
2 
931 (Utah App. 1994) (remand for supplemental findings); Kamdar & 
Co. v. Larav Co. , Inc. , 815 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah App. 1991) (personal 
jurisdiction) . 
Accordingly, the appropr i ate standard of review is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. Under this standard, this Court 
will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's 
determination was "beyond the limits of reasonabilify." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez, 
817 P2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991)). 
5 Is defendant's claim that the court erred in finding him 
competent to plead guilty adequately preserved where defendant, at 
his 1992 change of plea hearing, stipulated that he was competent 
and declined the court's offer of a competency hearing? 
"A party who leads a court into error cannot later complain of 
that error to obtain reversal." Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 
P.2d 598, 600 n.4 (Utah App. 1995) (quoted in State v. Price, 909 
P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995)), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) . 
6. Has defendant preserved his claim, argued for the first 
time on appeal, that the 1990 information was direct-filed in violation 
of the 1995 case of State v. Mohi? 
See standard of review for Issue No 3. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case does not involve the interpretation of 
any court rules or statutory provisions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges. Defendant was charged by Information as follows: 
Two counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (1990); 
Five counts of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (1990); 
One count of child kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1) (1990); 
One count of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); 
One count of failure to respond to officer's signal to stop, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-13.5 (1990); and 
One count of escape, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(1) (1990) 
(R. 3-5, addendum A). Defendant was bound over on all counts (R. 
1-2). Defendant pled not guilty (R. 18). 
Entry of 1990 guilty pleas. On 15 October 1990, defendant pled 
guilty and mentally ill to aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, 
theft, and escape (R. 30, 32, addendum B) .l He was committed to the 
Utah State Hospital for evaluation (id.). 
On 26 October 1990, defendant pled guilty and mentally ill to 
the additional charges of aggravated assault, kidnaping (a lesser 
included offense of child kidnaping) , and failure to respond (R. 62, 
addendum C). The court ordered a consolidated evaluation (id.). 
Defendant was advised of his right to withdraw his guilty pleas within 
30 days (id.). 
1
 R. 32, a minute entry, contains a typographical error: 
aggravated robbery (a first degree felony) is misidentified as 
aggravated assault (a third degree felony). The error is 
corrected in the court's Order for Mental Evaluation (R. 30). 
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Disposition. The State stipulated that defendant was mentally 
ill (R. 72) . The Court found that defendant was guilty and mentally 
ill, sentenced him to statutory terms to run concurrently, ordered 
him to pay restitution of $25, 000, and committed him to the Utah State 
Hospital (R. 73-74, 81, addendum D). 
Withdrawal of 1990 guilty pleas. Sixteen months later, on 5 March 
1992, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that 
they were not voluntarily taken (R. 95, addendum E) . He alleged that 
he was not mentally competent at the time of the pleas (R. 98-99) . 
The court set aside the guilty pleas, reinstated all charges, and 
appointed new counsel to represent defendant (R. 101, 106, addendum 
F) . The following day, defendant entered pleas of not guilty by reason 
of insanity to all charges (R. 102). 
Finding of competence. On 21 April 1992, the court, based on 
defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, ordered the 
Department of Human Services to designate professionals to evaluate 
defendant's mental condition (R. 103). On 6 July 1992, based on 
written mental evaluations and the stipulation of counsel in open 
court, the court found defendant mentally competent to proceed (R. 
119-20, addendum H). 
Entry of 1992 guilty pleas. On the same date, defendant pled 
guilty to two counts of aggravated assault (third degree felonies) 
and one count each of robbery and kidnaping (second degree felonies) ; 
the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 118, 121). 
Disposition. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent statutory 
terms (R. 121-22, addendum I). 
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Motion to vacate sentence. On 5 October 1993 Defendant filed 
a pro se motion to vacate his sentence on the ground that the 
presentence report "contained erroneous information and Defendant 
was not afforded ample opportunity to view and correct said erroneous 
information" (R. 123; see also R. 124-28). 
The court denied defendant's motion on the ground that "No Pre-
sentence Report was ever ordered by the Court and none was ever 
prepared and submitted to the Court prior to either of the Defendant' s 
Sentencing Hearings" (R. 133-34, 137) . 
Motion to vacate judgment and sentence. On 8 August 1995, 
defendant filed a pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence (no 
grounds specified) (R. 142) . On 21 September 1995, defendant filed 
a pro se Motion to Submit for Decision on Motion to Vacate Judgment 
and Sentence (R. 145). On 27 September 1995, defendant filed a pro 
se Motion for Expedited Disposition of Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Sentence (R. 147) and Motion to Submit for Decision on Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Sentence (R. 149) . On the same date defendant sent a 
letter to Judge Halliday requesting appointment of counsel and stating 
that defendant planned, in his words, "to sue the State of Utah and 
everyone who conspired the illegal Prison Sentence I am now serving" 
(R. 151) . 
Judge Halliday entered an order stating that ff[t]he Court has 
received pleadings in this case and in two other civil cases involving 
Defendant herein. Good cause appearing, the Court consolidated those 
civil cases" (R. 154). The court dismissed as untimely defendant's 
motion to vacate his sentence and suggested that defendant "pursue 
6 
the Extraordinary Writ proceeding which raises the same issues as 
are raised by the Motion herein" (id.). 
Motion to withdraw 1992 guilty pleas. On 17 May 1996, defendant 
filed a pro se motion and memorandum seeking to withdraw his 1992 
guilty pleas, citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6; rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; and rules 11 and 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (R. 162-74, addendum J). He also filed a request for 
hearing (R. 175, addendum K). Defendant claimed that he was not 
competent at the change of plea hearing because he had not been given 
his medications and requested relief from the 30-day time limit for 
withdrawal of guilty pleas on the ground that he had not been advised 
of it when he entered his plea (R. 164-67). 
The State resisted defendant's motion on the ground that it was 
untimely under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (1995) (R. 179, addendum 
L) . Defendant filed a response (R. 183-84, addendum M) and request 
for oral argument (R. 185, addendum N). 
On 6 June 1996, the court, without oral argument, denied the 
motion on the grounds that it was untimely and "to the extent that 
the matter has been ruled upon by another Judge that that decision 
is res judicata herein" (R. 180-81; see also R. 201, addendum 0). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 198).2 
2
 No new notice of appeal was required after the denial of 
defendant's subsequent motion for reconsideration, since that 
motion was untimely (see R. 180, 187, 201). See Utah R. App. P. 
4(b); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425, 426 
n.2 (Utah 1986); Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1075-77 
(Utah App. 1996); DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., 828 
P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1993). 
7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following factual summary is taken from the statements of 
defendant and his co-defendants in connection with their guilty pleas: 
On 4 August 1990, defendant and his co-defendants were being 
held in a juvenile detention center in Price, Utah (R. 25). They 
forcibly took the keys from the jailer, Alice Olsen, breaking her 
arm and several ribs in the process (R. 25, 37, 47, 112) . They also 
assaulted four other persons, attempting to inflict serious bodily 
injury; one of their victims suffered a stroke (R. 37, 47-48, 55, 
112) . 
Defendant and companions stole and fled in a car, in the back 
seat of which they discovered a small girl; they detained her while 
attempting to flee (R. 25, 37, 47, 55, 112). Police pursued them 
and signaled with lights and sirens for them to stop, but the 
perpetrators tried to outrun the police car; the resulting chase, 
involving speeds of 90 miles per hour or more, culminated in a serious 
accident (R. 25, 37-38, 47, 55)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Res judicata. The trial courtfs mistaken reliance on res 
judicata is harmless, since its primary reliance on the untimeliness 
of defendant's motion to withdraw was well taken. 
2. Untimely motion. The trial court reasonably exercised its 
discretion in denying as untimely defendant's motion to withdraw his 
1992 guilty pleas, since (1) defendant had been warned of the 30-day 
period in connection with his 1990 plea; (2) defendant's motion was 
approximately 1,380 days late; (3) defendant offered no explanation 
8 
why with reasonable diligence the facts alleged in his motion could 
not have been discovered some four years earlier; (4) this was 
defendant's second motion in this case to withdraw guilty pleas on 
grounds of mental incompetence; and (5) a delay of nearly five years 
carried great potential to prejudice the State on retrial. 
3. Post-conviction petition. Defendant claims that the trial 
court erred in not treating his motion to withdraw as a post-conviction 
petition. Because he never raised this issue before, it is not 
preserved. It also lacks merit, since he cites no authority imposing 
upon a trial court a duty to convert sua sponte a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea into a separate, civil post-conviction proceeding. 
4. Evidentiary hearing. Defendant claims that the trial court 
erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw. 
Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing lies within the discretion 
of the trial L mrt. The court acted reasonably in not holding an 
evidentiary hearing, since defendant's motion was untimely. 
5. Defendant's claimed incompetence. Defendant claims that 
the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw on the 
ground that he was mentally incompetent at the time the pleas were 
entered. However, since the court dismissed defendant's motion as 
untimely, it did not need to reach the merits of the motion. 
In any event, any possible underlying error committed by the 
plea court in finding defendant competent or in not holding a 
competency hearing was invited by defendant, who at the change of 
plea hearing stipulated to his competency and personally declined 
the court's invitation to hold a competency hearing. 
9 
6. Mohi claim. Defendantf s Mohi claim was not preserved below. 
He also affirmatively waived it with his unconditional guilty pleas 
in the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE DEFENDANT'S MOTION WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED AS UNTIMELY, THE COURT'S REFERENCE TO RES 
JUDICATA WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that, since he had never previously moved to 
withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas, any reliance by the trial court on 
the doctrine of res judicata in denying his motion was error. Br. 
Aplt. at 11-12. 
In denying defendant' s motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas, 
the trial court wrote: 
. . .Mr. Hickey has moved to withdraw his plea. It appears 
that he has, on another occasion, moved for such relief 
and that the same was denied by Judge Lyle Anderson. 
Certainly at this point in time the Court should deny the 
Motion for Withdrawal of the plea as being untimely and 
to the extent that the matter has been ruled upon by another 
Judge that that decision is res judicata herein. 
(R. 181) . This passage makes clear that the court's primary ground 
for denying defendant's motion was untimeliness. The court relied 
upon res judicata secondarily and then only "to the extent that the 
matter ha[d] been ruled upon" by another judge. 
Defendant's assertion that no other judge had ever previously 
ruled on a motion by defendant to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas, 
see Br. Aplt. at 12, is correct. The claims asserted in defendant's 
10 
motion had not been previously adjudicated.3 See Salt Lake Citizens 
Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. . 846 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Utah 
1992) ("res judicata bars a second adjudication of the same facts 
under the same rule of law").4 
Consequently, despite the court's apparent intentions, its order 
cannot rest in any degree upon the doctrine of res judicata. This 
is not a problem. This Court may "affirm the judgment . . . on only 
one of the grounds relied on by the trial court." Callister v. 
Millstream Associates, 738 P. 2d 662 (UtahApp. 1987) . It should affirm 
on the ground upon which the trial court correctly placed primary 
reliance: that defendant's motion was untimely. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY REFUSED TO EXERCISE ITS 
DISCRETION TO EXTEND THE 30-DAY DEADLINE FOR DEFENDANT TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion 
to withdraw his 1992 guilty pleas as untimely. Br. Aplt. at 12-16. 
Defendant argues that he was not advised of the 3 0-day deadline at 
the time of these pleas and, accordingly, the deadline may not be 
enforced against him. Br. Aplt. at 13. Defendant "assume[s] for 
the sake of this argument" that the court did not consider extending 
3
 The court's confusion had two possible sources: (1) co-
defendant Paul Payne's motion to withdraw, which Judge Bunnell 
denied as untimely and unmerited (R. 86-89, 92); or (2) 
defendant's prior motion to withdraw, based on mental 
incompetency, which Judge Boyd Bunnell granted (R. 95-101). 
4
 Although not res judicata, the principle underlying the 
trial court's ruling has merit. A defendant should not be 
permitted to enter a guilty plea, set it aside, re-enter the 
guilty plea, and have it again set aside on identical grounds, ad 
infinitum. 
11 
the time limit based on the failure to advise him of the deadline. 
Br. Aplt. at 14. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) provides: "A request to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made 
within 30 days after the entry of the plea."5 This time limit is 
jurisdictional. State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, "although the language of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is 
unconditional, it is subject to an exception incorporated within Rule 
11." Id. Rule 11(e) (7) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
that a court "may not accept the plea until the court has found . 
. . the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea. " Under rule 11 (f) , " [f ] ailure to advise 
the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside, 
but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6" (emphasis added). 
In sum, while there is a jurisdictional 30-day time limit for 
filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the court may extend the 
time for filing this motion if the defendant was not advised of the 
3 0-day limit. The court is not required to do so. 
A provision using the term "may" is permissive and leaves the 
matter "to the discretion of the court." State v. Robertson. 932 
P.2d 1219, 1233 (Utah 1997); accord Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 
818, 820 (Utah App. 1992) . A reviewing court "will not find an abuse 
5
 This provision became effective 24 April 1989, more than a 
year before defendant committed the crime at issue here. See 
Amendment Notes, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990). 
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of discretion unless the trial court's determination was fbeyond the 
limits of reasonability. '" State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 496 (Utah 
1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)). 
Thus, it is "up to the trial court to decide whether to allow such 
extension." State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 476 (UtahApp. 1991), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).6 
The trial court could not reach the merits of defendant's motion 
without first determining the issue of timeliness. For several 
reasons, the trial court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion 
not to enlarge the 3 0-day period. 
First, defendant had previously been advised of the 30-day time 
limit. Although he was not advised of it at his 1992 change of plea 
hearing, at his 1990 change of plea hearing, he and his co-defendants 
"were advised of their right to withdraw their pleas within 3 0 days" 
(R. 62) . Therefore, it is arguable that under Price the trial court 
actually lacked jurisdiction to enlarge the 30-day period. 
Second, this is not a case like Price, where the defendant filed 
on the thirty-first day. See 837 P.2d at 580. Defendant entered 
his pl;*a on 6 July 1992 and did not file his motion to withdraw that 
plea until 17 May 1996 (see R. 118, 121, 162, 174), missing the 3 0-day 
deadline by approximately 1,380 days. 
6
 A discretionary safety valve in a jurisdictional deadline 
is not irrational. This Court has previously noted that 
"permissive language" in a rule permitting federal courts to 
dismiss stale habeas corpus petitions "provides the federal court 
discretion to balance the equities of the particular situation, 
encourages a petitioner to act with reasonable diligence and 
guarantees necessary safeguards in hardship cases." Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1367 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. 
2254 rule 9). 
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Third, defendant did not identify any newly discovered evidence 
or theory, but relied on facts as accessible to him in 1992 as in 
1996. Even assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations in his 
motion and memorandum, defendant offered no excuse for his four-year 
delay. He cited the court's failure to advise him of the 30-day time 
limit, alleged that he was not given his medication at the time of 
his pleas, and claimed that he "had to be told four (4) years after 
his entering of the guilty pleas by the prison contract attorneys 
and other inmates to include that petitioner is extremely mentally 
ill and has been so since his teen years" (R. 167) . While some of 
these facts or allegations may relate to the merits of defendant's 
motion, none explains why his 1,380-day delay should be overlooked. 
He offered no explanation why these facts could not with reasonable 
diligence have been discovered before the passage of four years or 
why they excuse his extraordinary untimeliness. 
Fourth, this was defendant * s second motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas to these charges, and on the same grounds; after the first was 
granted, defendant again pled guilty (R. 94-95, 118, 121, 142). 
Fifth, a delay of nearly four years carried great potential to 
prejudice the State's case in the event a retrial were necessary. 
Cf. State v. Mildenhall. 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987) (finding on 
the facts of that case that "allowing withdrawal of the plea would 
greatly prejudice the State"). 
Defendant "assume [s] for the sake of this argument that the Judge 
did not consider extending" the deadline. Br. Aplt. at 14. This 
assumption is contrary to the settled practice of Utah appellate 
courts. In defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw 
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Guilty Plea, he urged the trial court to extend the 30-day time limit 
on the ground that he was not advised of it pursuant to rule 11(e) (7) 
(see R. 167) . Our courts "presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary." Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp. , 921 P.2d 997, 1001 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 
1984)). The legally required -- and most reasonable -- presumption 
is that the trial court considered the papers submitted by the parties 
and denied defendant's motion notwithstanding his arguments. 
Defendant relies on a tolling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 
(1995), as "persuasive authority" for his argument that his 
untimeliness should be excused on account of his mental incapacity. 
Br. Aplt. at 15. That provision states: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for 
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause 
of action accrued, either under the age of majority or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time 
of the disability is not a part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action. 
As defendant acknowledges, this statute by its own terms has no 
application to the case at bar, since defendant appeals from the denial 
of a motion, not dismissal of a cause of action. Moreover, defendant 
does not allege that he was continuously "mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian" for the entire four years after entry of 
his guilty pleas. 
The trial court did not act unreasonably in denying defendant' s 
motion to withdraw; accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion and 
this claim fails. 
15 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO CONVERT SUA SPONTE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS IN THE 
CRIMINAL ACTION INTO A CIVIL POST-CONVICTION PETITION 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have treated 
defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea as a post-conviction 
petition and thus excused defendant from the 30-day time limit for 
filing a motion to withdraw guilty pleas. Br. Aplt. at 17-18. 
A. This claim was not preserved. 
11
 [A] contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal." 
State v. Winward, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)). Defendant did 
not request that the trial court treat his motion as a post-conviction 
petition. Therefore, the issue was not preserved below. 
"However, three exceptions to this general rule are recognized 
in Utah." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997) . "An appellate court may address 
an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant establishes that 
the trial court committed !plain error,1 if there are 'exceptional 
circumstances,f or in some situations, if a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is raised on appeal . . . " id. (citations 
omitted). 
Defendant does not allege plain error, exceptional circumstances, 
or ineffective assistance. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993) (setting forth elements of plain error) ; Irwin, 924 P. 2d 
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at 7, 11 (noting that the "exceptional circumstances" exception is 
limited to cases involving "rare procedural anomalies") . This omission 
is fatal to his claim. Merely briefing an unpreserved issue on appeal 
is insufficient to bring an unpreserved issue within one of the 
exceptions. Where an appellant "does not argue that "exceptional 
circumstances1 or "plain error1 justifies a review of the issue, [this 
Court will] decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted) . Accord State 
v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (UtahApp. 1994) (declining to address 
issue where defendant briefed it on appeal, but did not assert either 
exceptional circumstances or plain error) (citations omitted). 
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for review, and 
failed to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances, this 
Court should not reach the merits of this claim.7 
B. This claim lacks merit. 
However, defendants claim lacks merit in any event. Defendant 
argues that his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and accompanying 
memorandum "substantially complied with the requirements of the rule" 
governing post-conviction petitions. Br. Aplt. at 16.8 He argues 
further that since post-conviction petitions "can be brought at any 
7
 Nor may an appellant raise in his reply brief an issue 
that should have been raised in his opening brief, since doing so 
would place appellees in the difficult position "of either 
missing the opportunity to brief the . . . issue or having to 
construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue." State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992). 
8
 Effective 1 July 1996 post-conviction petitions are 
governed by rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to 
that time, they were governed by rule 65B. 
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time while the petitioner continues to be imprisoned," the trial 
court's disposition was improper. Br. Aplt. at 17. 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a petition for post-
conviction relief "are two are separate and distinct procedures." 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 n.8 (Utah 1989). One procedure 
is direct and criminal, the other collateral and civil: "challenge 
may be made to a guilty plea either directly or collaterally. If 
it is made directly, it must be in the context of a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea, the denial of which can be appealed. If it is made 
collaterally, no prior motion to withdraw is required." Summers v. 
Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). 
The two procedures are frequently distinguished in the context 
of a defendant or inmate seeking to vacate his guilty plea. Salazar 
v. Warden. 852 P.2d 988, 990 n.3 (Utah 1993) (noting that defendant 
filed both a motion to withdraw guilty plea, which was later withdrawn 
as untimely, and a "petition for habeas corpus") ; Lancaster v. Cook, 
753 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah 1988) (per curiam) (holding motion to withdraw 
guilty plea is not a prerequisite to seeking post-conviction relief 
attacking the guilty plea) ; York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah 
App.) (noting that petitioner filed a "petition for writ of habeas 
corpus" but did not move to withdraw his guilty plea) , cert, denied, 
883 P.2d 135 (Utah 1994). 
Defendant has cited no case, and the State is aware of none, 
requiring a trial court to convert sua sponte a criminal motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea into a separate, civil post-conviction 
proceeding. 
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Defendant is familiar with these procedures. He previously filed 
parallel criminal and civil proceedings in a successful effort to 
vacate his first guilty pleas. When the trial court granted 
defendant's 1992 motion to withdraw his 1990 guilty pleas, it dismissed 
his proceeding seeking a writ of habeas corpus, Hickey v. Verville, 
Civil No. 91-266, "as the matter is now moot" (R. 101) . The court's 
ruling on defendant' s motion would not have mooted his petition unless 
the two sought the same relief. Therefore, defendant was experienced 
in seeking to set aside guilty pleas by parallel tracks. 
Despite the fact that he alludes to rule 65B in his motion to 
withdraw, defendant chose not to file simultaneous criminal and civil 
attacks on his 1992 guilty pleas. Having made that choice, he cannot 
charge the trial court with error for honoring it. 
Moreover, defendant has made no effort to support his assumption 
that a post-conviction petition "can be brought at any time while 
the petitioner continues to be imprisoned." Br. Aplt. at 17. While 
one judge of this court has adopted this "alternative interpretation" 
of the statute of limitations issue, see Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357, 1373 (Utah App. 1993) (Orme, J., concurring in result) , cert, 
denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994) , it does not represent the majority 
view of this Court. Thus, defendant has failed to establish that, 
even if the court had sua sponte converted defendant's motion to 
withdraw into a post-conviction petition, such a petition would have 
been timely. 
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POINT IV 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
WAS UNTIMELY, THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON ITS MERITS 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not conducting 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his motion to withdraw. Br. 
Aplt. at 18. "If proven true," he argues, "the fact of appellant's 
incompetence at the time the plea was entered would make the acceptance 
of the plea constitutionally deficient and would entitle appellant 
to withdraw the plea." Br. Aplt. at 19. 
The question of whether an evidentiary hearing is required is 
generally within the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g. , Andrews 
v. Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) 
(commutation of sentence) ; Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 
P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996) (attorneys fees); Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 
931 (Utah App. 1994) (remand for supplemental findings); Kamdar & 
Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah App. 1991) (personal 
jurisdiction). 
Accordingly, the appropriate standard of review is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. Under this standard, this Court 
will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court's 
determination was "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez. 
817 P2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991)). 
Whether a guilty plea is attacked directly in the context of 
a motion to withdraw or collaterally in the context of a post-
20 
conviction proceeding, "an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily be 
held unless the record of a prior hearing shows petitioner is clearly 
not entitled to relief." Summers, 759 P.2d at 345. 
The case at bar is not "ordinary" because defendants motion 
was untimely. Although no Utah case addresses this precise issue, 
general procedural principles dictate that where a motion or petition 
"is time barred by the . . . statute of limitations," a defendant's 
motion may be "properly dismissed without . . . an evidentiary 
hearing." Fredrick v. State. 906 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1993) . This is so here because, even assuming arguendo the truth 
of defendant's factual allegations, his motion was untimely. 
Since defendant's motion was time-barred, the trial court acted 
within the limits of reasonability "by not conducting an evidentiary 
hearing." Br. Aplt. at 18. 
POINT V 
THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW ARE NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION WAS 
TIME-BARRED AND BECAUSE ANY ERROR OF THE PLEA COURT WAS 
INVITED 
Defendant claims that "he was not mentally competent at the time 
his pleas were entered and therefore those pleas were not made 
knowingly and voluntarily." Br. Aplt. at 20. He argues that his 
evaluators found him competent only so long as he remained on his 
medications; that when he pled guilty he was not on his medications; 
and that the court committed "clear error" by not confirming that 
defendant "was currently in compliance with the explicit contingency" 
in the psychological reports. Br. Aplt. at 21-22. 
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Defendant recognizes that the trial court did not reach this 
question because it denied his motion as untimely. Br. Aplt. at 22. 
This fact is dispositive. 
This Court has repeatedly held that a court lacks jurisdiction 
to consider the merits of an untimely motion for relief of a civil 
judgment and errs in doing so. See Davis v. Grand Co. Service Area, 
905 P.2d 888, 896-91 (UtahApp. 1995); In re Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 
1285, 1287 (UtahApp. 1995); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. 
Inc. , 817 P.2d 382, 387 (UtahApp. 1991). Similarly, having determined 
that defendant's motion to withdraw was untimely, the trial court 
properly declined to adjudicate its merits, which were then moot. 
In any event, any possible underlying error committed by the 
plea court in finding defendant competent or in not holding a 
competency hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6 (Supp. 1992) , 
see Br. Aplt. at 21, was invited by defendant, as shown in the 
following colloquy from the change of plea hearing: 
THE COURT: So, what's your pleasure? Do we set this 
matter for hearing, or are you willing to just stipulate 
to those reports in [sic] as the record relative to his 
competency? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just a moment, Your Honor. 
(Off-record conversation.) 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] : We would stipulate that [defendant] 
is competent at this point, Your Honor, and we are prepared 
to proceed. 
THE COURT: And you don!t wish a hearing where we have 
[the doctors] come down and -- You could have a hearing 
where we'd have them come down and testify relative to their 
findings and so on. Do you wish that to take place? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
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THE COURT: You don't think that's necessary at this 
time? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: I see. Well, the Court, based upon those, 
will find that he is competent to proceed; that he 
understands the nature of these proceedings, and he is not 
only factually able to proceed and to assist counsel, but 
is also rationally able to do so. 
(R. 235-37, addendum G) . "A party who leads a court into error cannot 
later complain of that error to obtain reversal." Clark v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch. . 893 P.2d 598, 600 n.4 (Utah App. 1995) (quoted in State 
v. Price. 909 P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995). 
Even on the merits, the trial court acted properly. "Due process 
requires a court to sua sponte determine competency before taking 
a guilty plea when there is substantial evidence of incompetence such 
that a reasonable judge would have a bona fide doubt as to the 
defendant's competence." York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Here, if the 
mental evaluations left any lingering doubt as to defendant's 
competency, defense counsel's assurance that defendant was competent 
(and so apparently taking all necessary medications) removed it. 
Under these circumstances, no reasonable judge would have entertained 
a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency. 
Having stipulated that he was competent and having declined the 
court's offer of a hearing, defendant cannot now premise his claim 
of error on these issues. 
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POINT VI 
DEFENDANT'S 1992 GUILTY PLEAS IN DISTRICT COURT PRECLUDE 
HIS CLAIM THAT HIS CASE WAS DIRECT-FILED IN VIOLATION OF 
THE 1995 CASE OF STATE V, MOHI 
In reliance upon State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), 
defendant claims that the trial court in 1992 violated his 
constitutional rights by exerting jurisdiction over him, since he 
was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the crimes and his 
case was filed directly in the district court. Br. Aplt. at 22. 
This claim is not preserved. Defendant's appeal is from the 
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 198) . Neither 
that motion nor its supporting memorandum mentioned this claim (see 
R. 162-67) . Nor did defendant assert this claim in any of his three 
change of plea hearings or at any other time in this litigation prior 
to his appellate brief. Defendant "did not present this argument 
to the trial court, and therefore the issue was not preserved for 
appeal." Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitudes.-Inc. , 319 
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 35 (Utah App. 1997) (citing In re Estate of 
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 1997)). 
Defendant argues that he "raised this issue before the court 
in a separate civil action," which is currently stayed. Br. Aplt. 
at 4. Defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, 
for the theory that a litigant can preserve an issue for appeal in 
one action by asserting it in another. 
In addition to failing to preserve this issue, defendant 
affirmatively waived it by pleading guilty in the district court. 
A voluntary guilty plea in district court waives all non- jurisdictional 
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claims of error, including constitutional error, in the juvenile court. 
State in re E.G.T. . 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam) . 
However, "jurisdiction" in this context refers to subject matter 
jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. "[D]efects in personal 
jurisdiction can be waived"; it is only subject matter jurisdiction, 
which "goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action," 
that "cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver." Curtis 
v. Curtis. 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 5 C. Wright 
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (1969)). 
Nothing prevents the waiver of a Mohi claim. Mohi error is not 
jurisdictional: Mohi does not speak in jurisdictional terms, nor does 
its analysis implicate the "very power of a [district] court to 
entertain an action" against a juvenile accused of violent felonies. 
Mohi addresses only the means by which a juvenile is brought before 
the district court. Therefore, even if Mohi did entail a 
jurisdictional issue, it must necessarily be one of personal, not 
subject matter, jurisdiction. Consequently, a Mohi claim may be 
waived. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on & September 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
efVENTM ClSTRiC i CO'JRI 
""CArtOHCDUNlY.UlAK 
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF C^ffiON COUNTY 
STATE OF UT/ t f j ^
 | ? m 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P la in t i f f , 
/?}*!*« £»Si>4,YI ti'*l**f ?%3 
i ) E P U T Y INFORMATION 
309-8-90 
TINO RUEBEN ARCHULETA 
DOBt 3/16/73 
AILI KELNA MILLER 
DOB: 5/29/74 
PAUL RICHARD PAYNE 
DOB: 11/2/73 
Defendant(s). 
Criminal No. 9c i cr>r> P.fV- FS 
Criminal No. 9t / fctrfS - P S 
Criminal No. 9c/rt>rfi$£- - FS 
V • $ 
COMES NOW, the undersigned Carbon County Attorney, or Deputy Carbon County 
Attorney, and under oath states that he has rea*:n to believe that the above-
named defendant(s) committed the following crime;s): 
DATE: On or about August 4, 1990 
PLACE: Carbon County, State of Utah 
COUNT I: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-6-302 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did unlawfully and intentionally 
take personal property in the possession of another from his person or 
immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear, 
and in the course of committing the above-mentioned robbery, the defendant used 
a dangerous weapon or caused serious bodily injury upon another, the victim 
being ALICE OLSON? 
COUNT Hi AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
/76-6-302 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
Defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did unlawfully and intentionally 
( w e personal property in the possession of another from his person or 
nijtaiediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear, 
J> ;&nd in the course of committing the above-mentioned robbery, the defendant used 
tv/a dangerous weapon or caused serious bodily injury upon another, the victim 
being MELVIN HEIL; 
COUNT Hit AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did intentionally commit an act, 
with unlawful force or violence, that caused serious bodily injury to ALICE 
OLSON, or did use a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily injury to said person; 
INFORMATION 
209-8-9C 
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COUNT IV; AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, did intentionally commit an act, 
with unlawful force or violence, that caused serious bodily injury to MELVIN 
HEIL, or did use a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily injury to said person; 
COUNT V: CHILD KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-
5-301.1 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, 
at the time and place aforesaid, intentionally or knowingly without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim, seized, confined, detained, or 
transported a child under the age of fourteen (14) years with the intent to 
keep or conceal said child from his parents or any other person having legal 
custody of said child, the victim having the initials of J.S.j 
COUNT VI: THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-404, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time 
and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: an 
operable motor vehicle belonging to NANETTE SMITH; 
COUNT VIIi FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Section 41-6-13.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, while the 
driver of a motor vehicle, having received a visual or audible signal from a 
police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operated his vehicle in a 
willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or endanger 
another vehicle or person, or who did attempt to flee or elude a peace officer 
by vehicle, and while so doing traveled in excess of 30 miles per hour above 
the posted speed limit or caused damage to the property of another or bodily 
injury to another; 
COUNT VIII: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or 
violence to do bodily injury to DENNIS CHRISTENSEN, and in so doing used a 
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury; 
COUNT IXt AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or 
violence to do bodily injury to SHAYNE TERRY, and in so doing used a dangerous 
weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury; 
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COUNT X; AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 
76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said 
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, attempted with unlawful force or 
violence to do bodily injury to SCOTT ROBERTSON, and in so doing used a 
dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury; 
COUNT XI: ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-8-309 
(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the 
time and place aforesaid, escaped from official custody in an institution for 
confinement of juvenile offenders and employed force, threat, or a deadly 
weapon against a person to effect said escape; 
contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and against the peace arid 
dignity of the State of Utah. 
THIS INFORMATION is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: Scott Henrie, Roy Robinson, Dennis Christensen, Shayne Terry arid 
Scott Robertson/900800015 & 19 & 38/099000605/901274^126^ 
GENE STRATE 
Carbon County .Attorney 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this / day of August, 1990. 
GS/8/7/90 •RYNER, Circuit Jud w 
Addendum B 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE Date: October 15, 1990 9:30 a.m. 
JOHN GREENIG, COURT REPORTER Case No.: Criminal No- 90-41 
STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff Gene Strate 
vs 
ADRIEN RUSSELL HICKEY, Defendant Allen S Thorpe 
KIFUTP ENTRY 
Proceeding before the Court: CHANGE OF PLEA 
The Court was advised that the defendant wished to plead to some of 
the charges against him. To Count I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a first degree 
felony, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill. To 
Count III, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a third degree felony, the defendant 
entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill. To Count VI, THEFT, a second 
degree felony, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill. 
To Count XI, ESCAPE, a second degree felony, the defendant entered a 
plea of guilty and mentally ill. Defendant's Statement was submitted to 
the Court. Based on statement of defendant, the Court finds that the 
defendant is fully aware of his legal and constitutional rights and 
having freely and voluntarily waived those rights, and will order said 
pleas of guilty be entered. 
The Court orders the defendant be committed to the Utah State 
Hospital for evaluation and a report to the court. Upon receipt of the 
report, the Court will set a hearing to determine his mental illness. 
The Court orders the defendant be delivered immediately to the Utah 
State Hospital. 
BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
BY: LORENE BRUNDAGE 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
Addendum C 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE 
JOHN GREENIG, COURT REPORTER 
Date: October 26, 1990 - 3:30p.m. 
Case No.: Criminal No. 90-41 
STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff 
vs 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
AILI KEONA MILLER, & 
PAUL RICHARD PAYNE, Defendants 
Gene Strate 
Allen S. Thorpe 
Keith H. Chiara 
Dan C. Keller, for 
Michael A. Harrison 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceeding before the Court: CHANGE OF PLEA 
Mr. Chiara advised the Court that Defendant Miller was here toda 
for change of plea and enter pleas to COUNT I - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 
1st Degree Felony; COUNT III i IV - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rd Degre 
Felony; COUNT V - lesser included offense of KIDNAPPING, a 2nd Degre 
Felony; COUNT VI - THEFT, a 2nd Degree Felony; COUNT VII - FAILURE T 
RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, a 3rd Degree Felony; and COUNT XI 
ESCAPE, a 2nd Degree Felony. Mr. Keller advised the Court tha 
Defendant Payne was also here today for change of plea and enter plea 
to COUNT I - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a 1st Degree Felony; COUNT IV 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rd Degree Felony; COUNT V - lesser include 
offense of KIDNAPPING, a 2nd Degree Felony; COUNT VI - THEFT, a 2n 
Degree Felony; COUNT VII - FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL T 
STOP, a 3rd Degree Felony; COUNT VIII & IX - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3r 
Degree Felony; COUNT X - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rd Degree Felony; an 
COUNT XI - ESCAPE, a 2nd Degree Felony. The State advised the Cour 
what the plea negotiations were. 
To said counts, Defendants Miller and Payne plead guilty an 
defendants' statements were submitted to the Court. The Court i 
satisfied that the defendants are fully aware of their legal an 
constitutional rights, and having waived those rights, ordered thei 
pleas of guilty be entered. The counts remaining that were not take 
care of today are to be dismissed upon motion of the State. 
As to sentencing, Mr. Chiara asked that Defendant Miller be sent fo 
a 90-day evaluation but upon objection from the State, the Court ordere 
this matter referred to the Department of Adult Probation and Parole fo 
a presentence report on both of these defendants. Pronouncement o 
•i,*A, • A.*^ i — S A 4 &*\*» n A M A H l K A t a ^ 
Mr. Thorpe advised the Court that Defendant Hickey also here foi 
change of plea and enter pleas to COUNT IV - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a 3rc 
Degree Felony; COUNT V - lesser included offense of KIDNAPPING, a 2nc 
Degree Felony; and COUNT VII - FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TC 
STOP, a 3rd Degree Felony. To said counts, the defendant plead guilt} 
and mentally ill and defendant's statement was submitted to the Court, 
The Court is satisifed that the defendant is fully aware of his lega: 
and constitutional rights, and having waived those rights, ordered th< 
pleas of guilty and mentally ill be entered. 
As the defendant is presently under evaulation on his previous 
pleas, the Court will order the evaulation continued on the othe: 
counts. All defendants were advised of their right to withdraw thei: 
pleas within 30 days. 
BARBARA PROCARIONE, CLERK BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
BY: BARBARA PROCARIONE 
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Addendum D 
GEKE STRATE 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL MICKEY, , 
Defendant. 
1 J U D G M E M T 
Criminal No. 90-41 
The above-named defendant appeared on Monday, December 3, 1990, 
together with his attorney of record, ALLEN THORPE, and the defendant having 
previously entered his pleas of guilty and mentally ill to the charges of 
COUNT Ii AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony; COUCT IIIi AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT, a Third Dagr** Felony; COUNT IV s AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree 
Felony; COUNT Vs KIDNAPPING, a Second Degree Felony; COUNT VIt THEFT, a 
Second Degree Felony; COUNT VIIi FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO 
STOP, a Third Degree Felony and COUNT XIi ESCAPE, a Second Degree Felony, and 
Count and counsel having received an evaluation report from the Utah State 
Hospital, and counsel for the defendant and for the State having stipulated 
that the testimony of the examiners from the State Hospital would be that the 
defendant is mentally ill and counsel for the defendant having advised the 
Court that he had no legal reason to state why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
THE COURT FINDS that the defendant has a mental illness mid that he 
is a danger to himself and others and that it would be appropriate that he be 
committed to the Utah State Hospital; and 
MICROFILMED 
J0X&1 
LLrUTf 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN 
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a term on COUNT I of not less that five (5) years and 
which may be for life, on COUNT III serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) 
years, on COUNT IV serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years, on COUNT V 
serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than (15) years, on COUNT VI 
serve a term of not less than one (1) nor more than (15) years, on COUNT VII 
serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years, and on COUNT XI serve a term of 
not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years, with all of said jail 
sentences to run concurrently, and defendant is committed to the Utah State 
Hospital under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay one third of the 
restitution incurred to the victims herein. The Carbon County Attorney shall 
file with the Court a notice setting forth the total amount of said 
restitution, and counsel for the defendant shall file any objections to said 
amount within ten (10) days of receiving a copy of said notice. 
DATED this -* -» day of December, 1990. 
BY THE COURTt 
BCmTSO»lELLyi)istrict--ff'udae' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING w " 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment, postage prepaid, on this - J day of December, 1990, tot 
Allen Thorpe, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box 1238, Castle Dale, UT, 84513; Alice 
Olson, 211 S. 400 W., Price, UT, 84501; Nannette Smith, 457 S. 300 W., Price, 
UT, 84501; Mel Hell, 180 Locust, Helper, UT, 84526. 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary 
Addendum E 
Adrian Russell Hickey 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O. Box 270 
Provo, Utah 84603 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
5taie or UtaK 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
: MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
Plaintiff, : PLEA OF GUILTY 
vs. : 
: Criminal No. 90-41 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, : 
Defendant. : 
The Defendant, Adrian Russell Hickey, by and through himself,-
Attorney Pro Se, and pursuant to the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure 77-13-6 U.C.A. Amended files this Motion to Withdraw his 
Guilty plea. 
The Defendant wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty and the 
court has indicated he should submit a document. The plea was not 
taken voluntarily. The Defendant motions the Court to allow him to 
withdraw his Guilty plea and does so in conjunction with the 
enclosed Memorandum in support of this Motion. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this £V day of February, 1992. 
cryr 
J" ") ~ 
C'rt -ir p - ?•••!_. 
Adrian Russell Hickey 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O. Box 270 
Provo, Utah 84603 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA 
Criminal No. 910400597 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
The Defendant , Adrian Russell Hickey, by and through himself, 
Attorney Pro Se, and pursuant to the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure 77-13-6 U.C.A. Amended files this Memorandum of Support 
of his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
FACTS and ARGUMENT 
1* That the defendant, above-named is presently wrongfully 
unconstitutionally confined, detained and restrained in his 
personal liberty by the State of Utah under the color of state law 
at the Utah State Prison, located at Post Office Box 250, Draper, 
Utah 84020. 
2. The reason for this motion is that the plea was not taken 
voluntarily which has resulted in unconstitutional confinement, 
imprisonment and restraint presently imposed upon the Defendant is 
by virtue of the following conviction obtained and entered against 
the Defendant as the result of a plea of guilty before the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, in criminal case number 90-
41. Attached hereto is a copy of the Defendant's Judgement in this 
case dated December 3, 1990 for the Honorable Court's 
consideration. 
3. That the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, 
erred in his acceptance of the guilty plea entered by the Defendant 
in criminal case number 90-41, in counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII and 
XI. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is very specific on 
accepting pleas, Rule 11 - Pleas, (5) of the statute, which in the 
pertinent part states: 
4. The Court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has made 
the findings: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he 
has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory 
self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-
2 
examine in open court the witnesses against him, and that by 
entering the plea he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if no, what agreement has been 
reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits 
for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
5* In the case at bar the medical professionals responsible 
for his evaluation for competency were in total agreement that the 
defendant was completely unable to make a voluntary plea, 
understand his rights; understand the nature and elements of the 
offenses, that the burden was on the prosecution to prove the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, understand the possible minimum 
and maximum sentences, understand the plea discussion and results 
of those discussions and understand the time limits to file a 
withdrawal of a guilty plea, or appeal (evaluation attached). 
3 
The record in the instant case at bar, that the petitioner was 
evaluated by a physician and psychologist. These medical examiners 
state the Petitioner would meet the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR 
CH. Ill Part 404 P, App. 1, 12.05) for mental retardation which 
would make him qualify for Social Security Disability. This would 
imply the defendant is extremely impaired. 
The evaluation mental health specialists also indicated that 
the defendant was "seriously mentally ill" and likely suffering 
from "organic personality disorder of the explosive type.11 
The defendant was also taking the following medication 
"Serentil 25 mg. twice a day and 75 mg. at night. Serentil is an 
antipsychotic medication and hopefully will help his delusions and 
hallucinations. He also get Inapsine 5 mg. as needed every 8 hours 
for agitation, Benadryl 50 mg. as needed for sedation and help the 
side effects of the Serentil, and Motrin 800 mg. as needed for 
pain." The evaluation doctors1 concluding opinion is ..." Mr. 
Hickey is not competent to proceed. We believe that his metal 
illness or illnesses have seriously compromised his ability to 
rationally and factually aid in his won defense and to cooperate 
with his lawyer. Further, it is our opinion that he was not 
competent to proceed when he made the plea of guilty and mentally 
ill: We would request that his guilty and mentally ill plea be set 
aside, that he be found not competent to proceed, and the he be 
kept at the Utah State Hospital to see if we will be able to 
restore him to such a condition that he would be competent to 
proceed." (See attached of these doctors1 findings). 
4 
Sincerely Your(s) 
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
Philip Washburn, M.D. 
Clinical Director 
Forensic Security Unit 
Based upon the above information and the Utah State Statute 
mandating a certain level of competence in understanding the nature 
of the crime, the elements , the burden of proof and my rights at 
trial etc., which must be apparent before a plea is accepted. The 
Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this r$*/ day of February, 1992. 
&l/u**i fa Wl£ 
Adrian Russell Hickey 
; 
<! 
f 
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Addendum F 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CARBON, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD BUNNELL, JUDGE Date: April 20, 1992 - 1:30 p.m. 
ELECTRONIC RECORDING Case No.: Civil No. 91-266 
Criminal No. 90-41 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, Plaintiff Pro Se 
vs 
BOB VERVILLE, Defendant David F. Bryant 
(No Present) 
STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff Gene Strate 
vs 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, Defendant Keith H. Chiara 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceeding before the Court: HEARING (Writ of Habeas Corpus) 
As to the Motion to Set Aside the Plea in Criminal No. 90-41, th< 
Court heard statements of counsel and upon being fully advised in th< 
premises, now 
ORDERS: That it will grant defendant's motion to set aside his ple< 
of guilty. Upon motion of the State, the Court will order all elevei 
counts be reinstated. There being no objection from defendant, the Courl 
will appoint Keith H. Chiara as counsel for defendant. Defendant it 
remanded to the custody of the Carbon County Jail pending dispostion o: 
the criminal matter. Bail is set in the amount of $50,000.00. Thij 
matter is continued to 11:00 a.m. tomorrow (April 21, 1992) for entry of 
plea or motion for a preliminary hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ii 
Civil No. 91-266 is dismissed as the matter is now moot. 
bap 
Tape 92-20: 3485 
Addendum G 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Defendants. 
TRANSCRIPT OF 
SENTENCING 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Criminal No. CR 90-41 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled action came 
on for sentencing on July 6, 1992, commencing at thv hour 
of 9:30 a.m. before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District 
Court Judge, in the Utah and was electronically recorded. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
Price, Utah 84501 
Keith B. Chiara 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 955 
Price, Utah 84501 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Number 90-41, State of Utah 
vst Afojan RypgeH Hjckey. 
MR. CHIARA: Your Honor, I represent — 
6
 I THE COURT: Let's wait until the Defendant 
cones in. 
8
 I MR. CHIARA: All right. 
THE COURT: The record may show that the 
Defendant is present together with his counsel. The 
Court has received the reports from the alienists and 
doctors who were appointed at the State Hospital to 
examine him relative to his competency to proceed with 
trial. Let's see. Mr. Chiara, you received copies of 
" j those reports, have you? 
'* I MR. CHIARA: I have, Your Honor. Your 
•' ' Honor, I talked with Mr. Strate just before court began 
this morning, and we would join with him in requesting 
that the Court pass this matter to early this afternoon. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll pass this 
matter until 1:30. Is that going to be a convenient 
22
 I time? 
2* MR. CHIARA: Fine. 
2 4
 THE COURT: All right. We'll pass this 
2 5
 I matter until 1:30 this afternoon. 
2 
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(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: We'll take State of Utah ve. 
Adrian Russell Hickev. Criminal No. 90-41. We didn't — 
Did we enter an order relative to his competency to 
proceed? Did we cover that? 
MR. CEIARA: We haven't yet. 
TEE COURT: Okay. We'll have the record 
show that the Defendant and counsel are present and coun-
sel for the State is present. The Court has received the 
reports from the Forensic Unit of the Utah State Hospital 
relative to the examination that was conducted of Mr. 
Hickey pursuant to the request of the Court. I have the 
reports from Dr. Howell and also from Dr. Payne relative 
to those examinations relative to his competency to 
proceed. 
And, Mr. Chiara, you've had access to copies of 
those, have you? 
MR. CHIARA: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So, what's your pleasure? Do 
we set this matter for hearing, or are you willing to 
just stipulate to those reports in as the record relative 
to his competency? 
MR. CHIARA: Just a moment, Your Honor. 
(Off-record conversation.) 
MR. CHIARA: We would stipulate that he is 
3 
1 
2 
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a 
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competent at this point, Your Honor, and we are prepared 
to proceed. 
THE COURT: All right. The reports indi-
cate that in the opinion of the doctors, he is competent 
to proceed and understands the nature of the proceedings 
and is able to assist his counsel in the disposition of 
this matter. And now I indicate he is willing to stipu-
late to that fact. 
MR. CHIARA: If the Court would like to 
direct questions to Mr. Hickey, the Court may. 
THE COURT: You understand, Mr. Hickey, 
what we're doing here? 
13
 I THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
1
 THE COURT: You agree that these reports, 
I the Court can take those into consideration in making its 
ruling? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you don't wish a hearing 
where we have them come down and — You could have a 
hearing where we'd have them come down and testify rela-
tive to their findings and so on. Do you wish that to 
take place? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
2 4
 I THE COURT: You don't think that's neces-
1
 sary at this time? 
4 
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THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: I see. Well, the Court, based 
upon those, will find that he is competent to proceed; 
that he understands the nature of these proceedings, and 
he is not only factually able to proceed and to assist 
counsel, but is also rationally able to do so. 
So, what is the situation then, gentlemen, 
relative to the case? 
MR. STRATE: We discussed a possible 
disposition, Your Honor. I believe we arrived at a 
disposition. This would involve four different counts. 
We would propose, Your Honor, under what is presently 
Count I, Aggravated Robbery, Mr. Hickey be allowed to 
enter a Guilty plea to the included offense of Robbery, 
which would be a second-degree felony. 
It is also my understanding that he is willing 
to enter Guilty pleas to Count III, Aggravated Assault, 
which has the victim Alice Olsen; Count IV, Aggravated 
Assault, which has the victim Melvin Heil, as presently 
set forth; and also Count V, the included offense of 
Kidnapping, which is a second-degree felony. Whereupon, 
the State would move to dismiss the remaining counts. 
That would be two second-degree felonies and two third-
degrees that he would be pleading to. 
The State also, as part of plea negotiations, 
5 
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will join in the recommendation that he be sentenced 
concurrently on those. I believe that's what happened 
the last time. 
THE COURT: Count III is a third-degree 
felony, is it not? 
MR. STRATE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Count IV is also a third-
degree felony? 
MR. STRATE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Chiara, 
he's willing to do that? 
MR. CHIARA: Be is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. STRATE: I believe the other two 
defendants in this case were sentenced concurrently as 
well, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I see. Well, Mr, Hickey, why 
don't you and your counsel come up right here to the 
rostrum, and we'll talk to you a little bit about this. 
Your counsel, Mr. Hickey, has handed me what is 
entitled "Statement of Defendant" which you have signed, 
which explains to you some of your legal and constitu-
tional rights and explains to you that if I accept your 
pleas of Guilty on those counts as indicated, that you 
would be giving up those rights. You understand that, do 
6 
you? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
TEE COURT: You went over this statement 
with your counsel? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
TEE COURT: Is there any of those para-
graphs that you didn't understand or you understood them 
all when you went through them with him? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Be explained them to you, did 
he? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
TEE COURT: I still have to make certain 
on the record, Mr. Eickey, that you understand what some 
of your rights are that you are waiving. One is that you 
would be entitled to a trial by jury, if you care to have 
one. Do you understand you have that right? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Right. 
TEE COURT: You further understand that if 
a trial were held, you could either testify, or you could 
choose not to testify. And, if you chose not to testify 
at trial, that fact could not be held against you in any 
way. You understand you have that right not to testify? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Right. 
TEE COURT: You further understand that if 
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a trial were held, you and your attorney would have a 
right to be present, to examine all witnesses that were 
presented against you, and you'd have the right to sub-
poena witnesses in your own behalf; you understand that? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: Do you further understand that 
if a trial were held and you were convicted, you would 
have a right of appeal to an appellate court? If for any 
legal reason you felt the trial was not fairly conducted 
or you disagreed with some of the rulings of the court, 
you would have a right of appeal. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT; Right. 
TEE COURT: And do you understand that if 
I accept your pleas of Guilty as to these charges, you 
would be giving up those rights — you'd be waiving them. 
Do you understand? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Right. 
TEE COURT: And that's what you're doing, 
if I accept your plea. You understand that? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Yea. 
TEE COURT: Now, Mr. Eickey, if a trial 
were held, the State would have to prove what we call the 
elements of each of these offenses. For instance, under 
— Well, first of all, I guess I better get your plea on 
these before we proceed any further. I should have done 
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that. 
Let me ask you then, Mr. Hickey, to the lesser-
included offense under Count I of — It would be the 
lesser-included offense of Robbery alleged to have 
occurred on or about August 4th of 1990, this being a 
second-degree felony involving the taking of some pro-
perty from Alice Olsen, what is your plea: guilty or not 
guilty? 
TEE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: And to Count III, Aggravated 
Assault, this being a third-degree felony alleged to have 
•* I occurred on or about that same date involving the victim 
1
 of Alice Olsen, what is your plea: guilty or not guilty? 
14
 ' THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: And as to Count IV, Aggravated 
Assault, a third-degree felony alleged to have occurred 
on or about that same date involving Melvin Beil, H-e-i-
1, what is your plea on that charge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: And to the lesser-included 
offense of Kidnapping under Count V, which would be a 
second-degree felony involving the kidnapping of a person 
whose initials are J.S. alleged to have occurred on or 
about that same date, what is your plea to that count? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
9 
THE COURT: All right. Now, before I can 
accept those pleas, Mr. Hickey, I have to make sure you 
are aware of the rights we were just talking about. And 
if I were to re-ask you those questions, your answers 
would be the same, would they? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Hickey, if we tried 
this case, the State would have the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt what we call the elements of 
the offense. Under Count I they would have to prove that 
you took personal property from Alice Olsen or from her 
immediate presence by the use of either force or fear and 
that you intended to deprive her of that property. The 
State would have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If I accept your plea to that count, you're telling me 
that you actually did it, you see? You're admitting to 
those factual elements. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. Right. 
THE COURT: And under Count III, if we 
were to try it, the State would have to prove that you 
did assault Alice Olsen and that you used either a 
dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury while attempting to do bodily 
injury to her. And, if I accept your plea of Guilty, 
you're also admitting to those elements. You understand 
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that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: And under Count IV, Aggravated 
Assault, as applies to Melvin Heil, the State would still 
have the burden of proving the elements of that offense, 
too; that is, you intentionally and unlawfully caused 
serious bodily injury to Mr. Heil and that you did it 
with use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. And, if I accept 
your plea of Guilty to that count, you're also telling me 
that factually you did that. Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: And Count V, the lesser-
included offense of kidnapping, the State would have to 
prove that you seized this person illegally and inten-
tionally; that you transported him with the intent to 
either conceal or to deprive the legal custodian of the 
person. And the State would have to prove that also. 
And, if I accept your plea of Guilty to that count, 
you're also admitting factually that you did that. Do 
you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Bickey, the maximum 
sentence that I can impose under Count I, if I accept 
your plea, is a term of not less than one nor more than 
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Under Count III, the maximum sentence that I can impose 
would be a term not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison or a fine or both. Under Count IV, the maxi-
mum term would be a term not to exceed five years or a 
fine or both. And under Count V, the maximum term I 
could impose would be a term of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years or a fine or both. And you under-
stand that whatever sentence is imposed is entirely up to 
me; is that correct? Do you understand that? 
TBE DEFENDANT: Yea, I do. 
THE COURT: Of course, there is the 
I possibility that we could make those sentences run either 
1
 concurrently or consecutively, and the counsel have 
15 ' already stated their recommendations to me, and I don't 
see that I have any reason not to follow that recommenda-
tion. But you understand I'm not legally bound to do so? 
TBE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: I can deviate from that, if I 
decide to? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: You understand that? 
21
 | THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
1
 THE COURT: Are you entering this of your 
own free will, Mr. Hickey, other than the fact that the 
12 
State has agreed to allow the entry of the plea as indi-
cated to the lesser offenses and to dismiss the balance 
of the Information and to make the recommendation it did 
relative to sentencing? Other than that, has anyone made 
you any promises or any inducements to get you to enter 
this plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: So you are doing it of your 
own free will then? 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: The Court finds that the 
Defendant is aware of what his legal and constitutional 
rights are and that he is freely and voluntarily waiving 
those. And we'll order, then, that the pleas of Guilty 
to those counts be entered and, upon motion of the State, 
will order that the balance of the counts in the Informa-
tion be dismissed. 
Do you wish sentencing to take place at this 
time, Mr. Chiara? The law provides that you can — I 
can't impose sentence less than two days nor more than 
thirty from this date, but you can waive that and be 
sentenced now, if you wish to do so. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to be sentenced 
now. 
THE COURT: You'd like to be sentenced 
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now? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yea. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court has 
already heard the recommendation of the State, so the 
Court will order that the Defendant be imprisoned in the 
Utah State Prison for a term of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years under Count I, for a term of not 
to exceed five years under Count III, for a term of not 
to exceed five years under Count IV, and a term of not 
less than one nor more than fifteen years under Count V. 
And, since this all arose out of a common criminal 
episode, the Court will order that the sentences run 
concurrently — together, at the same time. And he is 
ordered committed to the warden of the Utah State Prison 
for the imposition of that sentence. 
MR. CHIARA: Thank you, Your Bonor. 
TEE COURT: Court is in recess at this 
time. 
(Sentencing concluded.) 
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I, Teresa Manzanares, do hereby certify that I am a 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah; 
That sentencing in the above matter was 
electronically record and said electronic recording was 
caused by me to be transcribed into typewriting; and the 
foregoing pages numbered 2 to 14 constitute a full, true 
and correct report of the same. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 1993. 
-) 
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 Teresa Manzanares J 
Notary Public ' 
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 Residing at Ferron, Utah 
'* My Commission Expires: 
I i ^ ^ t v TERESA KlANTAu^ZT 
" March 1, 1997 liGfo^Xd1*^' 
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Addendum H 
J:L-S 92 
GENE STRATE #3137 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Defendant. ' 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
I MENTAL COMPETENCY 
( Criminal No. 90-41 
The above-named defendant appeared on July 6, 1992, together with his 
attorney, KEITH H. CHIARA, and the Court and counsel for the defendant anc for 
the State having received written reports of mental evaluations performed at 
the Utah State Hospital, the agency designated by the Department of Human 
Services to evaluate the defendant's mental condition; and counsel for the 
defendant and for the State having stipulated in open court that the written 
evaluations of ROBERT J. HOWELL, PhD, and J. ANTHONY GILLETT, MD & MPH, be 
considered by the Court without formal testimony from said examiners or other 
witnesses; and the Court having duly reviewed said evaluations; 
The Court finds that the defendant, ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, is fully 
aware of the nature of the charges against him and the possible penalties for 
those charges; that he is able to assist counsel in his defense and to 
discuss possible plea negotiations with said counsel; and that he is 
rationally and factually able to comprehend the proceedings in this case; and 
based on these findings, 
SEVENTH DISTRICT C0U7.T 
STATE CF UTAH 
IT IS ORDERED that^the defendant is mentally competent to proceed. 
DATED this ^ d a v of July, 1992. 
BY THE 
momzf, Judged 
CERTIFICATE" OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order on Defendant's Mental Competency, postage prepaid, on this 
c day of July, 1992, to« Keith H. Chiara, Attorney at Law, P. 0. Box 
955, 37 East Main, Price, UT 84501. 
<??MAZ//WJ,*., 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary 
Addendum I 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE C-F UTAH 
GENE STRATE #3137 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Defendant. 
I JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
1 TO STATE PRISON 
i Criminal No. 90-41 
The above-named defendant appeared on Monday, July 6, 1992, together 
with his attorney of record, KEITH H. CHIARA, for sentencing, and having 
previously entered his plea of guilty to the charge of COUNT I: ROBBERY, a 
Second Degree Felony; COUNT III: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony; 
COUNT IV* AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony; COUNT V: KIDNAPPING, a 
Second Degree Felony; and having advised the Court that he had no legal reason 
to state why judgment should not be pronounced, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN 
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a term in the Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen 
(15) years on Count I; zero (0) to five (5) years on Count III; zero (0) to 
five (5) years on Count IV; and one (1) to fifteen (IS) years on Count V with 
all prison terms to run concurrently with credit given for 732 days already 
served. 
You, the said ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, are hereby rendered into the 
custody of the Sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by him delivered 
into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said State Prison. 
DATED this g day of July, 1992. 
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June 23, 1992 
The Honorable Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Judge. Seventh Judicial District Court 
for Carbon County 
Carbon County Court Complex 
149 East 100 South 
Price, Utah 84051 
Re: Adrian Russell Hlckey 
Criminal No. 90-41 
Dear Judge Bunnell: 
Dr. Payne 1s out of town for sometime. I have therefore examined the above 
defendant and providing the following report. 
BACKSEOUNn TNPORMATTON: 
This 1s a 19 year old single Caucasian male who comes from a very 
dysfunctional family 1n which the parents and all nine children used street 
drugs and alcohol to excess. This patient started smoking marijuana at age 
11. He Increased It until he used 1t dally. He has a history of cocaine use 
at 13. He overdosed on LSD at 14 and has continued to use crank and crack and 
continued to have some flashbacks up to the date of his original admission. 
The patient was originally admitted to Utah State Hospital on October 16. 199C 
and discharged January 31, 1992. He was referred by the PSRB to the Board of 
Pardons who placed him back 1n prison. He was then readmitted on the Hay 26, 
1992 for a 30 day evaluation. 
The patient has a long history of delinquent criminal and mentally 111 
behavior. He has been admitted Into state hospitals 1n Georgia, Kentucky, am 
Colorado and has been on psychiatric medication on and off for a considerable 
time. 
•" %e«r ooay..-. :* •-» «yr -
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PAST DIAGNOSIS: 
Axis I 310.10 Organic Personality Disorder (explosive type) 
Axis II 304.90 Polysubstance dependency NOS 
301.70 Antisocial Personality 01 sorder 
Axis III ' Borderline Intellect 
Full scale 10 1s 64 - 85, which places M m 1n the mild mentally defective to 
borderline Intellect. He also has a history of Attention Deficit Disorder and 
learning disorder is a child which probably was not treated at that time. 
On admission to Utah State Hospital on Hay 26. 1992, the patient stated that 
he had no particular complaints. He was "asking for an appeal of his 
sentence. I think, the case can be overturned and I will go free." He also 
stated that time that he was subject to "blackouts," 1n which he stated he 
starts to sweat and get nervous and does not remember what happens.- However, 
his account of these attacks does not correspond to anything pathological and 
if they in fact occur, they are probably hysterical dissociations. 
The patient was dressed appropriately. He was quiet and cooperative. He had 
a flat affect and stated that sometimes he heard what he described as 
"voices," but stated that were "roaring noises like a tiger" and at times he 
claimed to see "green demons." He has attempted suicide in the past 
approximately three times, but denied any thoughts of suicide at this time. 
He showed poor judgment. He was oriented and his memory, both recent and 
remote, appear to be Intact. 
TREATMENT: The patient was placed on Tegretol 200 mgs twice a day, on 
Sorentll 300 mgs each night, Prozac 40 mgs each morning, Ativan 1 mg 3 times a 
day, and Trazodone 150 mgs at night for sleep. The Tegretol was later 
Increased to 400 mgs twice a day. 
On this regime, he has done very well. He has three times been 1n seclusion 
for aggressive behavior, but apart from that, has shown relatively normal 
behavior. 
COMPETENCY: The patient 1s fully aware of the charges against M m and the 
nature of those charges being felonies. He 1s aware the possible sentences 
and can discuss the possible plea bargains that he might make. He understands 
the roles of the court officers, the prosecuting attorney, the judge, and his 
defense attorney, who X think he 1s able to assist 1n his own defense, and to 
discuss the circumstances of the crime and possible pleas. 
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It 1s my opinion that this patient 1s now competent to proceed to trial 1n 
accordance with Sections 71-15-1 of the Utah Code and that he will remain so 
as long as he stays on his present Dedications on a long tern basis 1n 
whatever environment he nay be. 
If I can give you any further Information, please let me know. 
Sincerely, ^ ^ 7 
C S 3. AnthonyGinett.IlD, MPH 
v
—"^ Rrt f«r+_ Am firf. Ptwph. lift Bd. Cert. . Bd  syc  Neuro. 
Clinical Director 
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cc: Keith CMara, Defense Attorney 
37 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Gene E. Strate, Carbon County Attorney 
County Office Building 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah B4501 
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6ENE STRATE #3137 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
120 Cast Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
ZM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Defendant. 
1 JUDGMENT AKD COMMITMENT 
90 STATE PRISON 
i Crlalnal Mo. 80-41 
The above-nased defendant appeared on Monday, July €, 1992, together 
with hit attorney of record, KEITH H. CKIARA, for sentencing, and having 
previously entered his plea of guilty to the charge of COUNT It ROBBERY, a 
Second Degree Felony; COUNT Hit AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony; 
COUNT IVi AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Decree Felony; COUNT Vt KIDNAPPING, a 
Second Degree Felony; and having advised tai tourt that he had no legal reason 
to state why Judgment should not be pronounced, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises; 
XT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said ADRIAN 
RUSSELL HICKEY serve a t e n in the Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen 
(15) years on Count I; sero (0) to five (5) years on Count Z H ; sero (0) to 
five (5) years on Count XV; and one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Count V with 
all prison tans to run concurrtntly with credit given for 732 days already 
served. 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Tou, the said ADRIAN KUSSELL KXCXEY, «x« hereby rendered into the 
custody of the Sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by hia delivered 
into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said State Prison. 
HAJED this ^ day of July, 1P92. 
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GENE STRATE #3137 
Carbon County Attorney 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 636-3240 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN RUSSELL HICKEY, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA(S) 
Criminal No. 90-41 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through the Carbon 
County Attorney, and objects to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea(s) which was dated May 12, 1996. The State moves the-
Court to deny saia Motion on the grounds that it is most 
untimely. The defendant entered his guilty pleas on July 6, 
1992, and UCA Section 77-13-6(2)(b) requires that a request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest shall be made within 
thirty days (30) aftfr entry of the plea. 
DATED this S ^ day of June, 1996. 
GE"NE" STRATE 
Carbon County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing OBECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA(S), postage prepaid, on this S day of June, 1996, to: 
Adrian Hickey #21184, U-2 1-01, PO Box 250, Draper, UT 84020. 
QTUMUI Wiih^ 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS Secretary 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN HXCKEY, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
BOARD OF PARDONS, et al., 
Respondents. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADRIAN HXCKEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 950700359 
Case No. 90-41 
The Plaintiff having filed on Kay 17, 1996 a Motion for 
Preparation of Transcripts and Administrative Records together with 
a Motion for Appointment of Counsel in Case No. 950700359, and the 
Court having reviewed the file and finding a Motion for Stay of 
Proceedings filed by the Defendant herein upon which no action has 
been taken, the sane having been filed on April 8, 1996, the Court 
now concludes that an Order staying the proceedings should be 
entered herein. Based upon the Stay Order the Court declines to 
2 
make any further orders on the Motion for Preparation of 
Transcripts and Administrative Records and the Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. The Court does note, however, that a 
previous Motion for Appointment of Counsel and for Transcript has 
been made in this matter and the Court has previously denied 
counsel and ordered in the associated matter that the best efforts 
of the Clerk be used to obtain transcripts. Because of the 
difficulty in discovering the whereabouts of the former reporter 
for this Court, it is likely that said transcripts may in fact be 
impossible to obtain. 
Based upon all of the foregoing this matter is hereby stayed 
xintil such time as the Supreme Court rules on the matter of Pavne 
vs- Th? vtaft stgt? Poftrd pf Pfrrflgmsi ?t Alt 
In case no. 90*41 Mr. Hickey has moved to withdraw his plea. 
It appears that he has, on another occasion, moved for such relief 
and that the same was denied by Judge Lyle Anderson. Certainly at 
this point in time the Court should deny the Motion for Withdrawal 
of the plea as being untimely and to the extent that the matter has 
been ruled upon by another Judge that that decision is res judicata 
herein. '^T&C 
DATED t h i s j S d t a y of June, 1996. 
3 
CERTTFTCATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the fj day of June, 1996# a -true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was Bailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Adrian Hickey 
c/o Central Utah Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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